Competing Rallies in Authoritarian Regimes


Manual


Shiyan Cao
(under review)

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Cao, S. Competing Rallies in Authoritarian Regimes. (under review).


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Cao, Shiyan. Competing Rallies in Authoritarian Regimes. (Under Review), n.d.


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Cao, Shiyan. “Competing Rallies in Authoritarian Regimes.” (Under Review).


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@manual{shiyan-a,
  title = {Competing Rallies in Authoritarian Regimes},
  journal = {(under review)},
  author = {Cao, Shiyan}
}

Abstract: How do rulers and opposition use competing political rallies to gain support from pivotal actors? I model rallies as Blackwell experiments that generate information about the regime. The ruler and the opposition interact repeatedly, deciding whether to call a rally and what information structure to employ. At each stage, a pivotal elite may end the contest by choosing a side. The theory predicts that the sequence of rallies depends on relative strength: the weaker side initiates a rally due to the risk that the game may end. The stronger side responds with a counter-rally only if the previous rally draws a high turnout. When the two sides differ greatly in strength, rallies tend to be more informative; when they are relatively equal in strength, the sequence of rallies and regime survival become less predictable. These results provide a theoretical foundation for studying competing rallies using case studies and empirical analysis.

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